Note and Comment by Wilgus, Horace LaFayette et al.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 19 Issue 6 
1921 
Note and Comment 
Horace LaFayette Wilgus 
University of Michigan Law School 
Edson R. Sunderland 
University of Michigan Law School 
Carl G. Brandt 
University of Michigan Law School 
A George Bouchard 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Courts Commons, Legislation Commons, and 
the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Horace L. Wilgus, Edson R. Sunderland, Carl G. Brandt & A G. Bouchard, Note and Comment, 19 MICH. L. 
REV. 628 (1921). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol19/iss6/5 
 
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
•V•LllBID llOllTJIL'I' 1711ZJBO TBB ACAllKllIC 'l'Ull, l:XCLVSI\'& o• OCTQaD, .... TJIB 
LAW SCHOOL OF THIE UNIVIElllllTY OF MICHICAN 
auaaCllll'TIOll PlllCE aa.10 PEii TEAii. 
RAl.P:a: w . .AIGu:R, EDITO:lt•IN-CBU:F 
ASSOCIA'l't :i;:DITORS 
80 CEllT8 PEii llUM8Ell 
HtNRY M. BATtS 
E. C. GoDDARD 
EDSON R. SuNJ>SRL.\ND 
Josu:a: H. DRAKI': 
JOHN B. WArt'8, 
STUDl':NTS, APPOINT:s> BY TH~ IIACUX.TY 
HnMAK A. AuGtrsT, of Michigan ]AMES I. McC1.n1Toc1t, of Coloradll 
OLIVEN. B.u.Tox, of Michigan Lxw1s H. MAnux, Qf Ohio 
A. GEQaGr: BoucHAm>, of Wisconsin WILLIAM C. O'KEE:n:, of Michipn 
ALAK W. BoYD, of Indiana Loms A. PA1JtD, of Iowa 
D. HALI: Buu, of .Michigan HAI:OLO M. SHAPDO, of Michipn 
CuI. G. BuxOT, of Michigan HAROLD R. ·SMITH, of Michipn 
FllEI>DICX D. CAuoLL, of Michigan W1xTE11 N. Sxow, of Maine 
Gxo:aGz D. CLAJ>PDTQN, of Michigar EowIN B. STASON, of Iowa 
RALPH E. GAULT, of Michigan JEAN PAtJL THOKAJI", of Michigan 
PAUL W. C">0BOON, of Illinois GLENN A. Tzxvo•, of Illinois 
Cs:ilLU E. TtrBNER, of Illinois 
NOTE AND COMMENT 
BovcoTT-CLA.YTON AcT.-In Duple~ Printing Press Company v. Deering 
et al. (January 3, 1921)~ 41 S. Ct. 172, the facts were: 
The plaintiff, a Michigan corporation, manufactures at Battle Creek, and 
sells throughout the United States, especially in and around New York City, 
and abroad, very large, heayy and complicated newspaper printing presses. 
Purchasers furnish workmen, but ordinary mechanics alone are not compe-
tent to do this, and so they are supervised! by specially skilled imchinists 
furnished by plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have ·always operated on the "open 
shop" plan, without discrimination against union .or non-union labor, either 
at its factory or at the place of installation of presses, but have not observed 
the eight-hour day nor the union scale of wages. 
Defendants are members of the International Association of Machinists, 
and are sued individually and in various representative capacities. This asso-
ciation is unincorporated, with a membership of over sixty thousand in vari-
ous districts and local unions throughout the United States. D and B are 
sued indiviqually and as representatives of unincorporated District No. 15, 
composed of six local lodges of the association in New York City. N is 
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sued individually and as agent of unincorporated local lodge 328, of this 
district. Another N is sued individually and as agent of the unincorporated 
Riggers' Protective Union of workingmen engaged in handling', hauling and 
erecting machinery, with jurisdiction over a11 union men in that business in 
New York City. 
It was also alleged that both the union machinists and union riggers 
were so affiliated with the Building Trades Council of New York City, 
including thirty different trades and over seventy-five thousand members, 
no oRe of which was allowed to work in or on a building where a non-union 
man was employed ; that it was practically impossible to erect any building 
in New York where any non-union man was employed; that the whole 
machinery of the council would be put in operation to prevent plaintiff from 
exhibiting its presses at a pending exposition; that the Association of 
Machinists and its branches were combining and conspiring to monopolize 
the machinist's trade throughout the United States, and prevent the employ-
ment of any machinist who was not a member by any employer unless be 
would operate a closed shop and employ only machinists who were mem-
bers of the union. 
No one of the defendants is, or ever was, an employee of the plaintiff, 
nor a ~mber or representative of any lodge or union not local to New 
York City. 
The suit was to enjoin an alleged conspiracy by the defendants to restrain 
plaintiff's interstate commerce in printing presses, contrary to the common 
law and to the Sherman Anti-trust Act. It was begun before, but not beard 
until two years after, the Clayton Act was passed, the provisions of which 
were invoked by both parties. 
Between 1909 and 1913 aU of plaintiff's competitors had recognized and 
dealt with the Machinists' Union and conformed to its reque!lts, but the 
plaintiff steadfastly refused. In 1913 two of these competitors notified the 
Union they should be obliged to terminate their agreements with it unless 
the plaintiff would accede to the union requirements. Because plaintiff 
refused to do this, eight months before suit was brought, the International 
Association of Machinists, with a view to compelling plaintiff to unionize its 
factory, enforce the "closed shop," adopt the eight-hour· day and the union 
scale of wages, called a. strike' at plaintiff's factory. Only fourteen union 
machinists, including three who supervised the erection of presses by plain-
tiff's customers, left. This did not materia11y interfere with plaintiff's busi-
ness and is not complained of in the suit. 
The acts complained of relate solely to the interference with the instal-
lation and operation of presses by plaintiff's customers, by an elaborate, 
country-wide programme, adopted and carried out by the defendants and 
their organizations, to boycott plaintiff's products; by warning Ct1Stom«s 
~t to purchase, or, if purchased, not to install presses; by threatening them. 
if they did, with loss by strikes of their employees and sympathetic strikes 
in other trade5; by notifying a trucking company not to haul presses, and 
threatening to incite their employees to strike if they did; by notifying 
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repair shops not to repair presses mad:e by plaintiffs; by threatening union 
me" with loss of union cards and being blacklisted as "scabs" if ·they helped 
install presses; by threatening an exposition company with a strike if it per-
mitted plaintiff's presses to be exhibited; and, generally, by injuring and 
threatening to injure in various ways plaintiff's customers and prospective 
customers, and persons handling, hauling or installing the presses. 
A typical illustration of the acts complained of is: The Italian Herald 
purchased a press; defendant D got to the Herald office before the press 
did; he told the Herald it had no right to purchase the press, and "we will 
make trouble as soon as it arrives"; this was made as promised; the trucking 
company was told to handle no more after that was delivered and it stopped; 
the owner of the building, then under construction, was told the union work-
men on the building would be called off on a strike, and the completion of 
the building would be delayed, if the installation of the press by the Herald 
was not stopped. This was done until Saturday afternoon, night, and Sun-
day, when installation was completed while the union workmen were not at 
work on the building. Another illustration: Plaintiff sold a press to N in 
New York City. Y, a member of the Machinists' Union, was to supervise 
its installation.; defendant D asked Y if he sided with the union or with the 
plaintiff; he replied he sided with the plaintiff, whereupon D said he wou!d 
take his union card away from him and blacklist him as a "scab" all over 
the East. D then followed Y down to the office of the trucking company, 
where he told the truckman not to haul the machinery; it would make trouble 
for him if he did; the truckman accordingly refused. No actual violence 
was used or threatened, although some occurred which was not definitely 
connected with the defendants. 
Manton, J., in the district court, after reviewing the testimony, says: 
"A careful reading of the entire record leads to the concltlsion Jthat if men 
have a right to strike and to endeavor to prevail upon others to fail to 
work for their employer, this is such a case as exemplifies careful, prudent, 
arut lawful conduct on the part of employees. There is nothing in this record 
which warrants my granting the injunction." 
On the other hand, Rogers, J., in the Circuit Court of Appeals, said the 
union men had been coerced by threats of taking away their cards and black-
lis~ing them as "scabs" ; customers have been intimidated by threats to call 
out men engaged in other trades or on uncompleted buildings; presses were 
not to be repaired, and threats to put them out of order were made; in one 
case defendants tried to obtain the cancellation of one of plaintiff's contracts. 
These are fair illustrations of the different views persons-judges as 
well as others-take of the same facts in labor controversies. Some think 
the acts commendable; others think them criminal. See especially the variety 
of the views taken by the judges in the case of Allen v. Flood.' 
Judge Manton of the district court held that under the common law of 
SAllen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1; i M1Cit. LAw REV. p. 28. Also, Du:u: CoKBIKA• 
TIOK I.Awa AS ILLUSTKATIKG THr: Rzl.ATIOK BZTWl!:EK I.Aw AKD 0!'1KIOK 1K EKGLAJn> DtJa• 
11(0 THI: NIKETEEHTH CID!fTUllY, 17 HAllv. I.Aw Rzv. sn, 532. . 
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New York, where the suit was brought, the secondary boycott was lawful 
if not accompanied by malice, violence, or fraud,' and that there was . no 
irreparable injury to any property right permitting an injunction under the 
Clayton Act.• · 
Hough, C. ]., and Hand, D. ]., in the Circuit Court of. Appeals, held the 
acts were lawful under the Clayton Act; but Rogers, C. ]., dissented. Hough 
and Rogers, C. n., held that by the common law of New York a secondary 
boycott was valid .under the decisions referred to; but Rog~rs, C. J., claimed 
these only applied to a general boycott of all non-union mills and non-union-
made materials, and not to a general boycott of a particular manufacturer 
for maintaining a closed shop, when others doing the same in the same 
industry were not so molested. Such was a malicious destruction of the 
good will of business of such manufacturers, and was not lawful in New 
York; and by the weight of authority elsewhere the boycott is unlawful.' 
Hough and Rogers, C. JJ., both were certain that the defendants ''have agreed 
to do and attempted performance of the very thing pronounced unlawful 
under the Sherman Act by the Supreme Court before the Clayton Act."' 
Manton, J., quoting from a former opinion of Hough, C. ]., sa:vs: "I 
ao not see any distinction which should make a legal difference between a 
lockout, a strike, and a boycott; all are voluntary abstentions from acts 
which normal persons usually perform for mutual benefits: in all, the reason 
for abstention is a determination to conquer by proving the endurance of 
the attack will outlast the resistance of the defense. For all, the New York 
law provides the same test: (I) Is the object legal? (2) Are the means used 
lawful?" 
Rogers, C. J., however, says:' "A strike a~d a boycott arc two quite dis-
tinct matters. A strike is an effort on the part of employees to obtain higher 
wages, or shorter hours, or a closed shop by stopping work at a preconcerted 
time. It is an attack made by employees upon their employer, by labor upon 
capital. But a boycott made by union labor against a product manufactured 
by non-union labor is an attack upon both labor and capital. It is the union 
employees on one side and. non-union employees and the open shop employer 
on the other. The principles applicable to a boycott are not applicable to a 
strike. The strike in Battle Creek may be lawful, while the boycott of the 
product in New ·York may be unlawful. The use of the· boycott is very 
generally held to be the use of unlawful means, and it is not material, where 
0 Bossert v. Dhuy {t!117), 221 N. Y. 342; Gill 8c Co. v. Doerr (D. C.), 214 Fed. 1u. 
•Oct. 15, 1914, C. 323, f 20, 38 ST. L. 738; CoKP. ST. 1916, I 1243d. 
•Citing State v. Stockford (1904), 77 Conn. 227; Purvis v. United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters (1906), 214 Pa. 348; State v. Stewart (1887), 59 Vt. 273; Wilson v. Hen17 
(1908), 232 Ill. 389; Beck v. Railway 8c Union (1898), u8 Mich. 497; Quinn v. Leatbem, 
[t901] A. C. 495. 
•Loewe v. Lawlor (1908), 208 U. S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 3c1; Lawlor v. Loewe (1914), 
235 U. S. 522, 35 S. Ct. 17b. 
•Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr (C. C. l!>t4), 214 Fed. 111. 
• 252 Fed. 733. 
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it is resorted to, whether the end sought-in this case the unionizing of the 
shops in Michigan-is lawful or not." 
These statements are also typical of the difference among judges as to 
the legal aspects of labor controversies. 
Both the District Court' and the Circuit Court of Appeals' held the Clay-
ton Act forbade an injunction, although, but for that act, one should have 
been granted. The Supreme Court reversed this, .Mr. Justice Pitney deliv-
ering the opinion for the majority, Mr. Justice Brandeis delivering a dis-
senting opinion concurred in by Holmes and Clarke, JJ. 
All agreed that the lower courts were right in giving effect to the Clay-
to~ Act, but they dis.agreed as to whether the proper effect was given. 
Justice Pitney held that Section 16 of the Clayton Act gave a private 
relief by injunction for threatened loss by a violation. of the anti-trust laws, 
which a private party did not have before ;10 that, by Section I of that act, the 
Sherman Act was defined as an anti-trust law; that plaintiff's right to manufac-
ture and sell presses in commerce is a property right; that unrestrained access 
to the channels of interstate commerce is necessary to its success; that the 
facts showed a widespread combination by defendants to obstruct this, result-
ing in substantial damage and threatening irreparable loss; that by the 
Sherman Act every conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
states is illegal;. that a conspiracy ·is a combination to accomplish an unlaw-
ful purpos.e, or a lawful purpose by unlawful means ;11 that the substance of 
the matters compl;iined of constitute a .secondary boycott-i e., a combination 
not merely to refrain, or peacefully to advise or persuade plaintiff's customers 
to refrain, from dealing with it ("primary boycott"), but to exercise coercive 
pressure upon such customers, actual or ptospective, in order to cause them 
to withhold or withdraw patronage from plaintiff through fear of loss to 
themselves if they deal with it; that the distinction between . primary and 
secondary boycott is material in the proper construction of the Clayton Act, 
but it is only of minor importance whether either is unlawfu1 at commou 
law in determining the right to· an injunction under the Sherman Act; that 
by the decisions under this act peaceable persuasion is as much prohibited 
as force or threats of force, and is not justified even if the participants have 
some object beneficial to themselves or their associates." 
The majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals held that under Section 
ao, in conjunction with Section 6 of the Clayton A<:t, no injunction could be 
.granted. Section 6 provides: "The labor of a human being is not a com-
•Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering (D. C., r9r7), 247 Fed. r92. 
1 Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering (C. C. A., r918), 252 Fed. 722. 
u Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal (I917), 244 U. S. 459, 471. 
11 Pettibone v. United States (1892), 148 U. S. 197, 203. Thiis is the usual definition 
ever since Tise r .. 1nuom.en·s Case, in 1664, cited in King v. Joumcynian Tailors (r721), 
8 Mod. n,320, and King v. Starling, l Keb. 650, 655, 675, I Sid. 174, pl. 6, 83 Eng. R. 
1164, 1167, 3 Cor.. L. R:r;v. 447 (1903). 
DLoewe v. Lawlor"(1908), 208 U.S. 274; Eancrn States Lumber Asso ..... United 
States (1914), 23i U. S. 600; Lawlor v. Loewe (1915), 235 U. S. 522, 534. 
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modity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws 
shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor organi:rations, 
instituted for the purposes of mutual help * * * or to forbid or restrain indi-
vidual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legiti-
mate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, 
be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint 
of trade under the- anti-trust laws." 
This only declares that nothing in the anti-trust acts shall be construed 
to forbid labor organizations or their members from law{ ully carrying out 
their legitimate objects, and does not authorize any unlawful activity or illegal 
conspiracy in restraint of trade. 
Section 20 provides: "No injunction shall be granted * * * in any case 
between an employer and employees * * * involving or growing out of a 
dispute concerning terms or r.onditions of employment, unless necessary to 
prevent irreparable injury to property or to a property right. * * * And no 
such injunction shall prohibit any person or persons, singly or in concert, 
from· terminating any relation of employment or from ceasing to perform 
any work or labor or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; from 
peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working; or from 
ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from per-
suading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; * * * or from doing 
any act or thing which might lawfully be done. in the absence of such dispute 
by any party thereto." 
All of the judges, in all the courts, agreed that the acts of the defendants 
amounted to a secondary boycott, of a coercive but not violent character. 
The controversy was as to the meaning of the ''blindly drawn" provisions 
of the Clayton Act, and especially of the words "employers," and "employees,'' 
and "others," in Section 20. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that "employ-
ers" and "employees," as used in Section 20, referred to the business clizss, 
to which the litigants belonged; and that the union and each of its sixty 
thousand members, although no one of them had ever been employed by the 
plaintiffs, having first created a labor disturbance by calling a strike at plain:-
tiff'~ factory, thereaiter had such an interest in the matter as to justify the 
union in calling strikes of the employees of other employers, between whom 
there was no dispute, and which employers had no business relatione with 
plaintiff except by purchasing pfcsses in the ordinary course of interstate 
commerce. 
Mr. Justice Pitney says: "We deem this construction altogether inad-
missible." The act imposes an extraordinary restriction on the equity powers 
of courts in the nature of a special privilege to a particular class; it would 
violate all the ordinary rules of construction to extend the privilege by 
loose construction beyond those who are proximately and substantially, not 
merely sympathetically, interested in "a dispute concerning terms or condi-
tions of employment"; Congress had in mind particular disputes, not a class 
war ; labor organizations are not mentioned in Section 20, and to extend a 
dispute directly affecting a few actual employees to all th .. members of the 
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union would so eniarge the meaning as to be inconsistent with Section 6, 
.which limits activity to lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; 
"ceasing to patronize" is limited to pressure on a "party to such dispute," by 
"peaceful and lawful" influence on neutrals, not by threats of strikes of theit· 
employees, to compel withdrawal of patronage of plaintiff to· induce him to 
yield. 
Justi~e Pitney in SUPP.Ort of this view quoted from the explanatory state-
ments made by the spokesman of the House of Representatives Judiciary 
Committee, who had charge of the bill when it was under consideration, such 
being a proper aid in ascertaining the legislative intent," as to the meaning 
cf Section 20. This was unequivocally to the effect that the section "was 
carefully prepared with the settled purpose of excluding the secondary boy-
cott; it was the opinion of the committees that it did not legalize it; it was 
not their purpose to authorize it, and not a member of the committee would 
vote to do so." By the construction given by the court below, an ordinary 
labor controversy in a manufacturing establishment justifies a nation-wide 
ock:tde of interstate commerce in its products by sympathetic strikes and 
boycotts against its customers, to the incalculable damage of innocent people 
remote from, unconnected with, and having no control over the actual dis-
pute, constituting the general public, and having a vital interest in unob-
structed commerce, which the anti-trust acts were to protect. 
Plaintiff has a clear right to an injunction under the Sherman Act as 
amended b!r the Clayton Act, and it is unnecessary to consider what the 
result :would be under the common law or local statutes. 
Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, says as to the common law: Defendants' 
justification is self-interest; they support the strike at the factory by a strike 
elsewhere against its product, not maliciously but in self-defense; plaintiff's 
refusal to deal with the union and observe its standards threatened not only 
the interests of its members at the factory but even more of all the affil-
iated unions employed by plaintiff's competitors, whose more advanced stand-
ards plaintiff was, in reality, attacking; the contest between the plaintiff and 
the union involves vitally the interest of every person whcse cooperation is 
sought. May not all with a common interest join in refusing ·to labor on 
articles whose very production constitutes an attack upon this standard of 
living and the institution which supports it? Yes, by common law principles, 
if. in fact they have a common interest. At first strikes were held illegal." 
Later, the obvious self-interest of the laborer in the improvement of his 
wages, hours and conditions of work constituted a justification."' Then some 
courts held the mutual interest of members of a union, in the union, was not 
suflicient self-interest to justify a strike to force the unionizati~n of the 
"Binns"· U. S. (1904), 194 lJ: S. 486, 495; Pennsylva1iia R. R. Co. v. International 
Coal Co. (1913), 230 U. S. 184, 198; Uni•ed States v. Coco Cola Co. (1916). 241 U. S. 
265, 281; U. S. v. St. Paul Ry. Co. (1918), ;z47 U. S. JIO, 318. 
,. Co1n1oxs, H1sT. ov LABOR, Vol. 2, Ch. 5. 
"'Pickett "· Walsh (1906), 192 Mass. 572. 
NOTE AND COMMENT 
shop.'' Other courts, viewing the same facts differently, held otherwise." 
Later, when centralization of business brought corresponding centralization 
in labor organizations, a single employer might, as here, threaten the stand-
ards of the whole organization, and then. naturalYy ~Q.e union would protect 
itself by refusing to work on his materials wherever found; here again some 
courts held the intervention of the purchaser broke the direct relation between 
employer and employee, and a strike against the materials was a str!ke 
against the purchaser by unaffected third parties.11 Other courts, better appre~ 
ciating the facts of industry, recognized the unity of interest throughout the 
union, and in refusing to work on such materials the union was only refusing 
to aid in destroying itself.11 On the question of. fact, I would say, as the 
lower courts said, the defendants and those from whom they sought coopera-
tion had a common interest, and. under the common law of New York the 
plaintiff had no caus·e of action."' 
The Clayton Act was the result of twenty years' agitation to equalize 
before the law the position of the employer and employee, as industrial com-
batants. The chief sources of dissatisfaction were the use of the injunction 
and the doctrine of "malicious combination" ; this made an act otherwise 
damnum absque injuria, as a result of trade competition, actionable as mali-
cious, if done for a purpose the judge co.nsldered socially or economically 
·harmful. Great confusion existed among the judges as to what purposes 
were lawful and what unlawful. By I9I4. it was thought Congress, and not 
the judges, should declare how the inequality and, uncertainty of the law 
should be removed and what damages could be inflicted on art employer in 
an economic struggle without liability, instead of leaving the judges to deter-
mine this according to their own economic and social views. This was the 
idea presented by the committees reporting the Clayton Act. Certain acts 
committed in the course of an industrial dispute, and which before were 
declared unlawful whenever the courts disapproved the ends for which they 
were performed, were declared not to violate any law_ of the United States; 
that is, the opinion of Congress as to the propriety of the purpose was sub-
stituted for that of differing judges; that relations between employers and 
workingmen were competitive; that organized competition was not harmful, 
and that it justified injuries necessarily inflicted in its course. The minority 
and majority reports of the house committee indicated such to be the pur-
11 Plant v. Woods (1900), 176 Mass. 492; Lucke v. Clothing Cutters (1893), 77 M<1. 
J96; Erdman v. Mitchell (1903), 207 Pa. St. 79. 
"National Protective Assn. v. Cumming (1902), 170 N. Y. 315; Kemp v. Division 
N'>. 241 (1912), 255 Ill. 213: Roddy v. United Mine Workers (1914), 41 Okla. 621. 
11 Burnham v. Dowd (1914). 217 Ma.•s. 351; Purvis v. Unit~d Brotherhood (1906), 
a14 Pa. St. 348; Booth v. Burgess (1906), 72 N. ]. Eq. 181. 
u Bossert v. Dhuy (1917), 221 N. Y. 342; Coh·n {\: Roth Elect. Co. v. Bri~lclayers 
(1917), 92 Conn. 161: State v. Van Pelt (1904), 136 N. C. 633; Grant Construction Co. 
Y. St. Paul Building Trades (1917), 136 Minp. 167; Pierce v. Stablemen's Union (1909)~ 
156 Cal. 701 76. 
•Bossert Y. Dhuy (1917), a21 N. Y. 342; Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardwell (1919), 
a27 N. Y. 1. Compare Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal '(1917). 244 U. S. 459, 471. 
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pose. If the act applies to this case, then the acts cannot violate "any law 
of the United States, and so not the Sherman Act." Congress did not restrict 
the provisions to employers and workmen in their employ. By including 
"employers and employees,'' and "persons employed md seeking employment,'' 
it showed that it was not merely aiming at a legal relationship between a 
specific employer and his employees. The contention that this case is net 
one arisi~g out of a dispute concerning the conditions of work of one of the 
parties is . founded on a misconception of the facts. 
Judge Brandeis adds that, because he concluded that both the common 
law of a state and a statute of the United States declare the right of indus-
trial combatants to push their struggle to the limits of the justification of 
self-interest, "I do not wish to be understood as attaching any constitutional 
or moral sanction to the right. * * * Above all rights rises duty to the com-
munity. The conditions of industry may be such that those engaged in it 
cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community. It is not 
for the judges to determine whether such conditions exist, nor their function 
to set the limits of permissible contest. This is the function of the legislature." 
One can hardly refrain from the remark, from the variety of views of 
the judges who pronounced opinions in this case, that it is about as easy for 
courts to determine what justice demands under certain conditions as to 
determine the meaning of an act of Congress. It would seem that Justice 
Pitney's quotations from the statements made in the Jtouse at the time of 
the report of the Judiciary Committee are the best evidence of what that 
committee meant to do and thought it had done, and that was to exclude 
~e secondary boycott from the things declared to be lawful. Soon after the 
Clayton Act was passed similar acts were passed in several states.11 The 
interpretation of many of these has often accorded with the majority opinion 
in this ca~e. u 
There is no doubt that there has been the trend and confusion in judicial 
decisions indicated by Justice Brandeis, and many more cases could be cited. 
So, too, there is no doubt that the common law ot New York'is as pointed 
out by him; and scarcely any doubt that the weight of authority elsewhere 
is otherwise, as indicated by Judge Rogers. Scarcely any English cases were 
cited. From the time when John Mewic would not let Matilda's tenants till 
her land in 1200,• and the bailiffs of Shrewsbury proclaimed no one in the 
town should sell merchandise to the Abbott of Litleshull in,1225,"' to Quinn 
v. Leathem• and Pratt v. Medical Association,• boycotting has been unlawful 
in the English law, although it did not get its name until about l88o, when 
Captain Boycott, representing Lord Earne, in Connemara, Ireland, gave notice 
to the lord's tenants to vacate, whereupon the people for miles around 
21 See 20 CoL. L. R&v. (June, 1920), p. 696. 
nJl>id., p. 697. 
•SELECT CIVIL PLEAS, Vol. I, p. 3, pl 7, 3 Selden Society. 
"SELECT PLEAS OF THE CzcwN, Vol. l, p. 115, p. 178, 1 Selden Society. 
• [1901] A. C. 495. 
• [1919] I K. B. 244, 18 MICH L. REV. 148 (Dec., 1919). 
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resolved to have nothing to do with him, nor allow anyone else to; so his 
laborers fled, he got no food, and no one woqld speak to him, until the Ulster-
ites came to his rescue, and civil war followed, which the government had 
to put down by the soldiers.21 There is also no doubt that, under the Slrer-
man Act and the decisions of the Supreme· Court before the Clayton Act, the 
defendants' acts were illegal. H. L. W. 
DISQUALIFICATION ol' JunGts BY PREJUDICE.-Under the provmons "of 
Section 2I of the Federal Judicial Code, Victor Berger and others, who had 
been indicted under the Espionage Act in the Northern District of Illinois, 
filed an affidavit charging Judge Landis with personal bias and prejudice 
against them as German-Americans, and moved for the assignment of another 
judge to preside at their trial. The motion was overruled by Judge· Landis, 
and he himself presided at the trial, and the defendants were convicted and 
sentenced. The Supreme Court of the United States, to which the matter 
came on certificate, held, three justices dissenting, that Judge Landis could 
not, under the statute, pass upon the truth of the facts alleged in the affidavit 
showing prejudice, but thaU, upon the filing of an affidavit sufficient on its 
face, he was incapacitated from further proceeding with the case. Berger v. 
United States, No. 46o, decided January 3I, 1921. 
This decision seems in harmony with the evident purpose of the statute, 
and is reassuring to all who feel that the courts cannot too strictly guard 
themselves from any suspicion of hostility or favoritism toward litigants. 
The common law was probably too indifferent on this matter. Blackstone 
says that "in the times of Bracton and Fleta, a judge might be refused for 
good cause; but now the law is otherwise, and it is held that judges and 
justices cannot be challanged." 3 CoMKENTARn:S, 362. But the obviously 
just rule that a man cannot be judge in his own case, now universally recog-
nized, would seem to extend itself in principle over every suit where a judge, 
by reason of prejudice and the consequent partisan interest which he devel-
ops, has made himself morally a party to the action. The section of the 
Federal Judicial Code on which the objection to Judge Landis was bastd 
undertook to put this principle into operation. Upon the filing .of the affidavit 
Judge Landis undoubtedly became a party to a controversy over his own fit-
ness, and he insisted on deciding the merits of the case in which he was a 
contestant. The Supreme Court thought him qualified to decide the legal 
sufficiency of the showing made, but not to pass upon the truth of the accu-
sation. 
Under a somewhat similar statute in Montana it has been held that the 
filing of a proper disqualification affidavit ipso facto deprives the judge of 
further authority to act. State ex rel. v. Clancy, 30 Mont. 529; State ex rel. 
v. Donlan, 32 Mont. 256. Under the California statute a similar result fol-
lows in justice court cases, People v. Flagley, 22 Cal. 34. and in superior 
court cases where no counter affidavits are filed, People v. Compton, 123 Cal. 
21 I.Aw AS TO BOYCOTT, WYMAK (1903), 15 Green Bag, 20S-:n5. 
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403. The "salutary rule" of relieving the judge from the "very delicate and 
trying duty of deciding upon the question of his own disqualification" received 
,the warm approval of the California court in the case last cited. 
The Berger case effectually disaffirms the doctrine of Ex pa.rte N. K. 
Fairbanks Co., I94 Fed. 978, where Judge Jones, in the Middle District of 
Alabama, held, in a long and elaborate opinion, that Congrr.ss could not, 
under the Constitution, "lawfully enact that a judge, who is in truth qualified, 
is in law disqualified because a suitor makes an affidavit to that effect, and 
make that ex Parle statement conclusive proof of the disqualification and cut 
off all judicial inquiry as to the judge's competency." He contended that 
the disqualification of a judge to try a particular case must rest upon facts 
which unfit him, and the existence of such facts must be determined as a 
judicial question by some judicial tribunal; that if the filing of the requisite 
affidavit operated to pr~vent the judge from further acting in the litigation 
we should have a situation where "the affidavit maker in fact, though not in 
name, puts on the judicial robes and excludes the presiding judge and all 
other judicial authority from any voice in determining the -matter, :md by 
the mere filing of an affidavit renders judgment of disqualification and exe-
cutes it," citing Mabry v. Baxter, II Heisk. (Tenn.) 689, li!>I, and' Sanders v. 
Cabanni.ss, 43 Ala. I73, in condemnation of such a procedure as an illegal 
assumption by the legislature of judicial power. 
Although two dissenting opinions were filed in the Berger case, written 
by Justices Day and McReynolds, neither of them suggests that the con-
struction of the statute given by the majority of the court involves any uncon-
stitutional interference with the judicial power vested in the courts. 
E. R.S. 
ACCIDENT IN WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATION.-The interpretation of work-
men's:-compensation statutes has caused the courts a great deal of difficulty. 
The usual statute provides for compensation for an "accident arising out of 
and in the course of the employment." Such a type of statute has made it 
necessary for the courts to inquire into what constitutes an accident, what 
is an accident arising out of the employment, and what is an accident arising 
in the course of the employment. Each one of these inquiries has been the 
source of much litigation, and it has now become fairly well settled as to 
what accident "arises out of and in the course of the employment." See I2 
MICH. L. REv. 6I4, 688; I4 MICH. :r.,., REV. 525; I5 MICH. L. REv. 92, 15o6; I6 
MICH. L. REv. I79. 462; I8 MICH. L. REv. 72, I62. The question as to what 
constitutes an accident is still the subject of many varied decisions. The 
problem was involved in the recent case of Prouse v. Indust1'ial Commission 
(Colo., 1920), I94 Pac. 625, where the court (two judges dissenting) held 
that a coal miner was not injured by accident where a germ i:lisease had 
proved fatal because he had become weakened hy foul air and dioxide gas 
which came from an inclosed entry that the miners had broken into. 
One of the. principal reasons for the variety of decisions in regard to 
the word "accident" is that the word is used in many different senses, and 
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there are times when a liberal interpretation. is called for and others where 
a strict construction is demanded. The courts, in interpreting accident insur-
ance policies, generally hold that if the death is caused by a previously diseased 
conditian of the body, without which the death would not have followed 
the injury, it is not an.accidental death. National Masonic Assn. v. Shyrock, 
73 Fed. 774- In workmen's compensation cases, however, it is generally held 
that anything contributing directly or indirectly to incapacity following an 
injury is suffiCient within the compensation lawlj. Indian Creek Mining Co. 
v. Calvert, II9 N. E. (Ind. App.) 519; Robbins v. Gas Engine Co., 191 Mich. 
122. 
A disease contracted by gradual process, commonly known as an indus-
trial or occupational disease, is not an accident within the compensation 
laws. Liondale Bleach, Dye and Paint Works v. Riker, 85 N. J. L. ¢; 
Adams v. Acme 1-Vhite l.ead and Color Works, 182 Mich. 157; Paton v. Dixon, 
[1913] 6 B: W. C. C. 882; Evans v. Wood, [1912] 5 B. W. C. C. 305. The 
usual reasoning of the courts is that an accident m·:st have definite time, 
place, and circumstances. Other courts take the view that the important 
characteristics of an accident are that the injury be unexpected and uninten-
tional. Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Commission, 177 Cal. 614; Indian Creek 
Mining Co. v. Calvert, supra. These two lines of reasoning show that the 
courts which adhere to the first view adopt the layman's interpretation of 
an accident, while the others have used the. word in a special legal sense. 
Under either line of reasoning, a man slowly acquiring lead poisoning while 
working in a mine is not injured by accident; but should there be a caving-in 
of a wall which held back poisonous fumes, and the workman should, as a 
consequence, acquire lead poisoning suddenly, there would be an injury by 
accident. 
The situation of the English law is, at present, in this position. Where 
a workman gradually contracted eczema while employed at dipping rings in 
a chemical, it was held not to be an accident. Evans v. Wood, supra. But 
recovery was allowed in Alloa Coal Co. v. Drylie, [1913] Sess. Cases 549, 
where a water pump burst and the workman died from pneumonia (a germ 
disease) contracted from standing in the cold water. In the case last cited, 
Lord Dundas delivering the majority opinion, said that the disease was 
attributable to some particular event or occurrence of an unusual and unex:. 
pected character incidental to the employment, and could fairly be termed 
an accident. Lord Salverson, rendering a dissent in the same case, .said that 
if the deceased's legs had become inflamed from standing in the cold water, 
or if the water had been corrosive in its character, there would have been 
an injury by accident. This English case and the recent Colorado case are 
similar in that the workman in each case died from a germ disease resulting 
from his weakened condition. The cases are, however, by no means analo-
gous and the facts are sufficiently different to warrant opposite results. 
Poor air in a mine is to be expected, but the bursting of a \\·ater pipe is 
unexpected; and- if the English court were to decide the Colorado case and 
were to apply the reasoning used in the Alloa Coal Co. case, it would in :ill 
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probability reach the same conclusion that the majority reached in the Colo-
rado case. 
The situation in the Wisconsin court is much the same as that in Eng-
land. In Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., I6x Wis. 370, it was held that 
a laborer contracting typhoid fever by <irmking impure water was injured 
by accident because the affliction was attributed to the undesigned and unex-
pected presence of bacteria in the drinking water. The principal difference 
between the majority and the dissenting opinions seems to be that the latter 
emphasized the fact that no external violence occurred. • The Wisconsin 
Industrial Commission has held that a gradually acquired occupational dis-
ease is not an accidental injury within the meaning of the act. Derkindern 
v. Rundle Mfg. Co., Rep. Wis. Indus. Comm. (I9I4-15) 16. 
The California court expressed the reason for the many conflicting views 
on the subject when it said that in workmen's compensation cases it gave 
the phrase ".sustained by accident" a broad construction in harmony with 
the spirit of liberality in which the statute was conceived. Fidelity Co. v. 
Commission, I77 Cal. 614 This spirit of liberality is described in Ross v. 
Erickson, 8g Wash. 634 where the court said that injustice to the laborer 
and hardships to the industries of the state alike called for some plan that 
would relieve the servant of the necessity of pursuing his remedy in the 
courts andl subjecting himself to all the harassments, vexations, and uncer-
tainties attending a trial. The laws are designed to protect the workman, 
but the courts will not allow them to be used to mulct the employer and 
the public. It is for this reason that vocati9nal diseases are not included 
within the statutes, because the cause of the injury is not traceable with 
reasonable certainty by any reliable method of proof. To allow such specu-
lative claims would be to encourage fraudulent practices and would con-
tribute to defeating the broad purposes underlying the compensation lay;s. 
The question whether the cause of the injury is traceable by any reliable 
method of proof should, therefore, determine whether recovery should be 
allowed! under the "sustained by accident" clause. It is by this test that it 
must be decided whether an unexpected and unintentional injury constitutes 
a11 accident or whether actual physical violence is necessary. See I4 Cor.. 
L. Rr:v. 563, 648. C. G. B. 
LIC'£Nsts-0RDINANCt AUTHORIZING COMMISSIONER TO Rr:voKt SoF'l' 
DRINK LictNSE INVALID.-The city of Tacoma passed an ordinance creating 
a license department in the department of public safety, which provided 
for licensing and regulating soft drink and candy stores. The ordinance 
arranged for the means of securing such a license and· then enacted: "Th~ 
license of any business mentioned in this section may be revoked by the 
commissioner of public safety in his discretion for disorderly or 'immoral 
conduct or gambling on the premises, or whenever the preservation of public 
morality, health, peace or good order shall in his judgment render such revo-
cation necessary. Such revocation. shall be subject to appeal to the city 
council, to be prosecuted by filing a written notice with the council within 
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ten days after the revocation. Upon receipt of such appeal the council 
shall appoint a day for hearing the appeal, giving the appellant at least three 
days' prior notice in writing thereof. The decision of the council shall be 
final." M, being the possessor of a duly issued license under this ordinance 
to carry on the business of selling soft drinks and candy, had established 
such a business. The commissioner of public safety, being of the opinion 
that the business as conducted by M had become a menace to "the preser-
vation of public morality, health, peace, and good order," assumed to revoke 
the license. M challenged the validity of the act. Held, the ordinance is 
unconstitutional. State er rel. Makris v. Superior Court of Pierce County, 
(Wash., 1920), 193 Pac. &Js. 
The court held that the effect of this ordinance was to place in the 
hands of the commissioner of public safety, and in turn in the hands of the 
city council upon appeal from the commissioner, the arbitrary power, uncon-
trolled by any prescribed rule of action, to decide who may and who may 
not engage in and carry on the lawful business of selling soft drinks in 
the city. 
It is submitted that from what appears in the report of the case the 
decision is wrong. In the lower court a trial was had on the merits, which 
resulted in the court denying relief to the plaintiff. It must, therefore, 
have been found that the commissioner did not act arbitrarily, and that 
he did not discriminate against the plaintiff. The evidence must have satis-
fied the court that the plaintiff conducted his business in such a way as to 
be a menace to "the preservation of public morality, health, peace, and 
good order." It is to be noticed that there is no allegation or evidence 
that the commissioner acted arbitrarily or with the intention of unjustly 
discriminating against the plaintiff. 
It is also interesting to notice that the court cites the leading case of 
Yick Wo v. Hcpkins, u8 U. S. 356, in support of its decision. This cai;e 
is frequently cited by courts and text writers as an authority for the prop-
osition that an ordinance which vests a purely personal and arbitrary power 
in the hands of a public official is a denial of due process of law. That 
case involved an ordinance which required all persons desiring to establish 
laundries in frame houses to obtain the consent of certain officials. Yick 
Wo, a· native of China, who had conducted a laundry in a wooden building 
for twenty-two years, and who had complied with all existing regulations 
for the prevention of fire and the protection of health, was refused such 
consent, upon his- application; and he was convicted and imprisoned> for 
conducting his laundry without such consent. His petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus was denied by the state supreme court and he appealed to 
the U.nited States Supreme Court. It is difficult to tell from the report 
just what the court decided. There is sonte language in the opinion to 
justify the conclusion that the court held the ordinance unconstitutional 
on the sole ground of vesting an arbitrary discretion in a public official. 
The court says: "The very idea that one man may be compelled to hold 
his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoy-
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ment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable m any 
country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery ibelf." 
In regard to the ordinances the court say~ : "They seem intended to confer 
and actually do confer, not a discretion upon consideration of the circum-
stances of each case, but a naked and arbitrary power to give or withhold 
consent, not only as to ph~ces, but as to persons. * * * The power given to 
them is not confided to their discretion in the legal sense of that term, but 
is granted to their mere will. It i~ purely arbitrary, and acknowledges 
neither guich!.nce nor restraint." 
The effect of the above passage is weakened somewhat as the evidence 
in the case showed· that the ordinance in actual operation had been directed 
exclusively against the Chinese. The evidence showed "an administration 
directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons as to warrant 
the conclusion that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinance3 
so atlopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with their 
administration, and thus representing the state itself, with a mind so unequal 
and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state of that equal 
. protection of the law which is secured to the petitioner as to all other 
persons by the broad and benign provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
The court then goes on to say: "Though the law be fair on its face and 
impartial in appearance, yet if it is administered by public authority with 
an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal 
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances material to their 
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Con-
stitution." 
However, it is submitted that a careful analysis of the case shows that 
the court did not declare the ordinance unconstitutional, either because it 
vested an arbitrary power in the hands of a public official or because the 
evidence showed; a wanton and wilful discrimination by the persons charged 
with its administration against a particular class of persons. It merely 
decided that the petitioner cot•ld not be punished under the ordinance. But 
as the Supreme Court has never been called upon since to determine exactly 
what was decided by the court in Yick W o v. Hopkin.~, there must be more 
or less speculation about it. · 
Two years before the decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra, the 
Supreme Court decided in Barbier v. Connolly, II3 U. S. 27, that an ordi-
nance of the city of San Francisco providing that no person should carry 
on the business of a public laundry within certain limits without a certifi-
cate from the health officer, and another certificate from the Board of Fire 
Wardens, was valid. The Ccnnecticut court in E; parte Fiske, 72 Conn. 
125, reconciles these cases by saying : "A correct understanding, however, 
of the extent to which that case goes (Yick Wo v. Hopkins) can be ha<l 
only by considering that the proof, which the court looked into, showed 
that the ordinance there under review was so administered as to exclude 
the subjects of the emperor of China, and no others, from the business of 
keeping a laundry. • • * It is evident from the language that the decision 
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rested mainly upon the admitted discrimination against. a class of persons 
in the public administration of the ordinance. The decision, therefore, as 
an authority, goes no further than to hold that, under a state of facts sim-
ilar in character to the facts of that case, an ordinance similar in character 
.to th!! one there passed on would be invalid." 
There are no such facts in the principal case. There is no evidence 
that there was any discrimination in the administration of the ordinance 
against the plaintiff. On the contrary, the case was tried on its merits, and 
the trial court refused to grant the plaintiff any relief. It is true that under 
the ordinanc~ in question the commissioner is given considerable disi:retion 
in determining what was a menace to "the preservation of public morality, 
health, peace, and good order." But could the legislature prescribe a more 
definite rule of action? It seems obvious that the legislature could not 
define all the circumstances and conditions which would be a menace "to 
the preservation of public morality, health, peace. and good order." It seems 
that in the very nature of things the determination of what conditions 
come within the general rule must be left to an administrative officer. 
The cases are in conflict on this questfon of the validity of statutes and 
ordinances conferring unrestrained discretion. Many courts have upheld 
ordinances similar to the one in the principal case. In Wilso~ v. Eureka 
City, 173 U. S. 3z, the court upheld an ordinance which forbade any person 
mov~g a frame building owned by him without the written permission of 
the mayor. The court approves the summary of cases in Re Flaherty, 105 
Cal. 558, in which unrestrained discretion is sustained, and declare that dis-
cretion;;iry power is "based on the necessity of the regulation of rights by 
uniform and general laws-a necessity which is no better observed by a 
discretion in a board of aldermen or council of a city than in a mayor." 
In Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213, it was held that no relief could 
be granted against a law merely because it confers a discretion readily sus-
ceptible of abuse, if no actual discriminato.ry administration is shown. In 
People v. Von De Corr; 19') U. S. 552, after citing a number of cases sus-
taining a delegation of discretion to a board, the court says: "These cases 
leave in no doubt the proposition that the conferring of discretionary power 
upon administrative boards to grant or withh~ld permission to carry on a 
trade or business which js the proper subject of regulation within the police 
power of the state is not violative of rights .sc:cured by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. There is no presumption that the power will be arbitrarily 
exercised, and when it is shown to be thus ~erciscd against the individual, 
under sanction of state authority, this court has not hesitated to interfere 
for his prqtection, when the case has come before it in such manner as to 
authorize the interference of the federal court," citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
supra. In Davis v. M ossachusett.r, l(Q U. ·s. 43, an ordinance of the city of 
Boston providing that "no person shall, in or upon any of the public grounds, 
make any public address," etc., "except in accordance with a permit from 
the mayor," is· valid. ThC£e cases would seem to indicate that the Supreme 
Court of the United States is committed to the doctrine that administrative 
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officers may be given discretionary power to act according to their own 
unrestricted judgment, and that an ordinance or law granting this authority 
is not, uj)on its face, void. In Commissioners of Eaton v. Covev, 74 Md. 262, 
an ordinance was sustained requiring a permit from the commissioners for 
the erection of a building in the city; in Kessinger v. Hay, 52 Tex. Civ. 
App. 295, 113 S. W. 1005, an. ordinance was upheld requiring hackmen to 
secure a license to use the streets as a public stand, reserving to the munici-
pal authoriti"es the discretion to say who shall and who shall not have per-
mits; in Es parie Bogle (Tex.), 179 S. W. u93, an ordinance giving- the 
city authorities discretionary power to grant or refuse a license for operating 
a jitney was upheld; in Laurelle v. Bush, 17 Cal. App. 409, 119 Pac. 953, an 
ordinance giving tbe police commissioner power to grant or refuse a permit 
to operate a moving picture show was upheld, although it did not pr~scribe 
methods for its application. The court said : "It is a w.ell recognized :rule 
of statutory construction that a general grant of power, unaccompanied by 
specific direction as to the manner in which the power is to be exercised, 
implies a right and a duty to adoi;;t and employ such means and methods as 
may be reasonably necessary to a proper exercise of the power. * * * Tested 
by this rule, it cannot be said that the board of police commissioners is 
vested with an undefined" and whimsical discretion in the matter of granting 
or refusing a permit." 
Not every act giving an arbitrary discretion to an administrative officer 
should be upheld, but in passing upon questio~s of this character practical 
considerations and the necessity ,of administrative efficiency should be con-
sidered. In these days, when the extent of governmental functions has 
become so great and complicated, it seems that about all the legislature can 
do is to declare the general policy of the law, and leave its enforcement and 
applicatjon to the discretion of some official. It is presumed such discretion 
will be exercised Jtonestly. It seems reasonable that the courts should inter-
fere with the exercise of such discretion only when it is alleged and proved 
that this discretion has been abused. See IQ MxcH. L. Rsv. 211; also, FR!tUND, 
Pou~ Powo, Secs. 642-655. A. G. B. 
